Google has fired back at the Department of Justice (DOJ), offering its counterproposal to the DOJ’s proposed remedies in its landmark antitrust case against the search giant.

The DOJ has proposed that Google be forced to sell its Chrome web browser, and possibly its Android operating system. The DOJ has also proposed limitations on Google’s ability to invest in, or collaborate with, other AI companies. Under the proposal, Google would not be allowed to acquire, collaborate with, or invest in any firm that develops AI or uses the technology in query-based tools.

Kent Walker, Chief Legal Officer, slams the DOJ’s proposal as an “interventionist agenda” that goes far beyond establish court precedent.

As part of its lawsuit over how we distribute Search, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a staggering proposal that seeks dramatic changes to Google services.

DOJ had a chance to propose remedies related to the issue in this case: search distribution agreements with Apple, Mozilla, smartphone OEMs, and wireless carriers.

Instead, DOJ chose to push a radical interventionist agenda that would harm Americans and America’s global technology leadership. DOJ’s wildly overbroad proposal goes miles beyond the Court’s decision. It would break a range of Google products — even beyond Search — that people love and find helpful in their everyday lives.

Google’s Proposal

Google’s Lee-Ann Mulholland, VP or Regulatory Affairs, has authored a blog post that similarly comes out swinging against the DOJ’s proposal, calling it “overbroad,” and promising that Google will appeal the court’s decision.

We will appeal the Court’s decision but the process requires that we first file proposed remedies. This is a case about contracts. Antitrust law is clear that remedies should be directed to those contracts, unlike DOJ’s overbroad proposal.

While Google plans to appeal, before it can do so, it must file its own remedies proposal, which Mulholland goes on to outline.

Browser agreements:

• Browser companies like Apple and Mozilla should continue to have the freedom to do deals with whatever search engine they think is best for their users. The Court accepted that browser companies “occasionally assess Google’s search quality relative to its rivals and find Google’s to be superior.” And for companies like Mozilla, these contracts generate vital revenue.
• Our proposal allows browsers to continue to offer Google Search to their users and earn revenue from that partnership. But it also provides them with additional flexibility: It would allow for multiple default agreements across different platforms (e.g., a different default search engine for iPhones and iPads) and browsing modes, plus the ability to change their default search provider at least every 12 months (the court’s decision specifically referred to a 12 month agreement as “presumed reasonable” under antitrust law).

Android contracts:

• Our proposal means device makers have additional flexibility in preloading multiple search engines, and preloading any Google app independently of preloading Search or Chrome. Again, this will give our partners additional flexibility and our rivals like Microsoft more chances to bid for placement.

Oversight and compliance:

• Our proposal includes a robust mechanism to ensure we comply with the Court’s order without giving the Government extensive power over the design of your online experience.

Mozilla Weighs In

Mozilla—maker of the Firefox web browser and strong privacy proponent—has weighed in on the DOJ’s proposal with concerns of its own. Mozilla derives the bulk of its revenue from Google, in exchange for making its search engine the default in Firefox. Ironically, the deal is one of the things the DOJ made an issue of in its court case.

In [a blog post](So how do browser engines tie into the search litigation? A key concern centers on proposed contractual remedies put forward by the DOJ that could harm the ability of independent browsers to fund their operations. Such remedies risk inadvertently harming browser and browser engine competition without meaningfully advancing search engine competition.

Firefox and other independent browsers represent a small proportion of U.S. search queries, but they play an outsized role in providing consumers with meaningful choices and protecting user privacy. These browsers are not just alternatives — they are critical champions of consumer interests and technological innovation.

Rather than a world where market share is moved from one trillion dollar tech company to another, we would like to see actions which will truly improve competition — and not sacrifice people’s privacy to achieve it. True change requires addressing the barriers to competition and facilitating a marketplace that promotes competition, innovation and consumer choice — in search engines, browsers, browser engines and beyond.

We urge the court to consider remedies that achieve its goals without harming independent browsers, browser engines and ultimately without harming the web.), Mozilla acknowledges that it receives revenue from Google, but says the deal actually helps Mozilla achieve its goals. Mozilla also says that it partners with Google because it’s the best option, something Mozilla discovered after working with other search engines.

For the past seven years, Google search has been the default in Firefox in the U.S. because it provides the best search experience for our users. We can say this because we have tried other search defaults and supported competitors in search: in 2014, we switched from Google to Yahoo in the U.S. as they sought to reinvigorate their search product. There were certainly business risks, but we felt the risk was worth it to further our mission of promoting a better internet ecosystem. However, that decision proved to be unsuccessful.

Firefox users — who demonstrated a strong preference for having Google as the default search engine — did not find Yahoo’s product up to their expectations. When we renewed our search partnership in 2017, we did so with Google. We again made certain that the agreement was non-exclusive and allowed us to promote a range of search choices to people.

The connection between browsers and search that existed in 2004 is just as important today. Independent browsers like Firefox remain a place where search engines can compete and users can choose freely between them. And the search revenue Firefox generates is used to advance our manifesto, through the work of the Mozilla Foundation and via our products — including Gecko, Mozilla’s browser engine.

Mozilla then goes on to voice its concerns about the DOJ’s proposed remedies, saying they risk doing far more harm than good, especially to independent browsers.

So how do browser engines tie into the search litigation? A key concern centers on proposed contractual remedies put forward by the DOJ that could harm the ability of independent browsers to fund their operations. Such remedies risk inadvertently harming browser and browser engine competition without meaningfully advancing search engine competition.

Firefox and other independent browsers represent a small proportion of U.S. search queries, but they play an outsized role in providing consumers with meaningful choices and protecting user privacy. These browsers are not just alternatives — they are critical champions of consumer interests and technological innovation.

Rather than a world where market share is moved from one trillion dollar tech company to another, we would like to see actions which will truly improve competition — and not sacrifice people’s privacy to achieve it. True change requires addressing the barriers to competition and facilitating a marketplace that promotes competition, innovation and consumer choice — in search engines, browsers, browser engines and beyond.

We urge the court to consider remedies that achieve its goals without harming independent browsers, browser engines and ultimately without harming the web.

Conclusion

There’s no denying that Google has a monopoly over the search market, and it’s hard to argue that the company uses exclusivity deals to maintain the dominance it enjoys.

At the same time, Mozilla’s argument is not without merit. If the court prohibits Google from making such deals, Mozilla stands to lose the most, as it will lose out on hundreds of millions per year in revenue—revenue the organization uses to further its pro-privacy efforts.

The issue highlights the challenges involved in addressing Google’s dominance in a way that doesn’t make the situation far worse than it already is.